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PUBLIC NUISANCE AS RISK REGULATION
Thomas W. Merrill`

INTRODUCTION

Public nuisance has always been defined in terms of the object of
protection - the community, the public, or perhaps even the state as a whole.
Public nuisance in this regard has been juxtaposed to private nuisance, which
protects individual persons and their use and enjoyment of land.
Commentary on public nuisance has thus long been concerned with defining
(without notable success) what it means to advance a public as opposed to a
private right.'
In this paper, I offer a different take on the function of public nuisance.
The common law is designed to provide redress for actual harm, whether it
be the breach of a contractual promise or an injury to a person or property
caused by the defendant's tortious act. The requirement of actual harm, in
turn, may be related to the standard form of relief at common law, which is
money damages. Damages are easier to calculate when actual harms can be
identified and measured.2 The limitation to actual harm, however, leaves a
major lacuna in the common law: How can the system protect persons against
the risk of future harm? My contention is that a central function of public
nuisance was to supply - however imperfectly - a form of regulation of risks
that had not yet resulted in actual harm.
I.

THE FEATURES OF PUBLIC NUISANCE THAT POINT TO RISK
REGULATION

My claim that public nuisance is significantly directed at regulating risk
does not mean that this is its only function. Public nuisance has also served
as a device for aggregating claims of existing harm to a significant number

* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School.
For my own efforts to delineate the difference between public and private rights (without notable
success) see Thomas W. Merrill, Private and Public Law 575-91, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
NEW PRIVATE LAW (Andrew Gold et al. eds. 2021); Thomas W. Merrill, Private Property and Public
Rights 75-103, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW (Kenneth Ayotte and

Henry E. Smith, eds. 2011).
2 Cf Thomas W. Merrill, The Compensation Constraintand the Scope of the Takings Clause, 96
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421 (2021) (arguing for the importance of ability to measure compensation in

determining the scope of the Takings Clause).
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of persons. 3 In this aggregating respect, public nuisance can be seen as a
precursor of the modern class action. But risk regulation is an underappreciated function of public nuisance. The "essential element" of a public
nuisance, as one modern court has recognized, is that "persons have suffered
harm or are threatenedwith injuries that they ought not to bear." 4
That public nuisance is often concerned with risk of future harm
distinguishes it from other forms of liability. As a form of risk regulation,
the function of public nuisance is to eliminate a condition that imposes the
risk of harm, either by deterring the defendant from engaging in the activity
that creates the risk or by forcing the defendant to eliminate the risk. This is
in sharp contrast to more common forms of legal liability, which are designed
to compensate - to provide redress - for harms that have already been
inflicted. Tort actions, in particular, invariably require the plaintiff to prove,
as part of its action, that the defendant's act has caused the plaintiff actual
harm, nearly always physical harm to a person or property. Showing that the
defendant is engaged in an activity that presents a risk of harm is almost never
sufficient.5
Consider the paradigmatic public nuisance: blocking a public highway.6
Some merchants and travelers will be affected immediately; others may be
affected in the future if the obstruction is not removed. Even those who never
use the highway will face a risk that the blockage will diminish the welfare
of the community by disrupting commerce and interfering with intercourse
among residents and visitors. So, even if blocking the highway creates an
immediate and actual harm to some, it poses a risk to all. The same analysis
applies to public nuisances in the form of obstructions to navigable
waterways.
A concern with risk can also be discerned in other conditions identified
as public nuisances by early sheriff's courts called "leets": "washing hemp
or flax in streams or ponds used for watering cattle," letting animals "wander
suffering from the scab," victuallers who sell "unwholesome food," and those
who catch "immature fish or hunt[] out of season." 7 Later, when public
nuisance actions moved to the royal courts, we find further examples of risk
3 For example, cases finding a public nuisance based on the presence of "odor and flies" emanating
from a cattle feedlot presumably identify a present harm (although the flies might also be a source of

future disease). Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P. 2d 700, 705 (Az. 1972).
4 Wood v. Picillo, 443 A. 2d 1244, 1247 (R.I. 1982) (emphasis added).
5 There are exceptional cases in which injunctions have been granted based on a substantial risk of
future harm, typically in the nature of a nuisance. See, e.g., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc.,

426 N.E. 2d 824 (Ill. 1981).
6 Both Bracton and Britton in their Thirteenth Century treatises mention blocking a public right of
way as the principal example of a "legal nuisance by reason of the common and public welfare." HENRY
DE BRACTON, 3 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 191, f. 232b (Samuel E. Thorne

Ed. 1977); see also 2 BRITTON 319-20 (Francis Morgan Nichols trans., 1983). See generally J.W. Neyers,
Reconceptualizing the Tort of Public Nuisance, 76 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 87, 93 (2017) (noting that
"obstructing highways (i.e., dedicated roads or navigable waterways) is the core case")).
J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance - A CriticalExamination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 55, 60 (1989).
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regulation. In Baines v. Baker,8 decided in 1752, an injunction was sought
by a neighbor against an "inoculation hospital" that was deliberately
exposing persons to smallpox in an effort to immunize them from the disease.
The plaintiff was alarmed that the risk of contracting smallpox from the
hospital would cause his tenants to quit the property. The chancellor ruled
that the action, if it could be brought at all, would have to be maintained by
9
the Attorney General as a public nuisance claim. And in the 1840s and
1850s, multiple actions were brought against municipal corporations that
discharged untreated sewage into the nearest river, "turning it into a moving
10
tide of filth which endangered the health of those who lived downstream."
In the United States, we see a similar pattern. Most early public
nuisance actions "involved the obstruction of either public highways or
navigable waterways."" By the 1840s, "industrialization also brought public
nuisance claims alleging new types of injuries: water pollution and air
pollution resulting from industrial enterprises."'Z In all early public nuisance
cases, we see that some people would be immediately harmed, but the entire
community faced at least a risk of harm.
The risk-regulating nature of public nuisance is further confirmed by the
fact that some forms of activity were regarded as a public nuisance even
though they presented only a risk of future harm. Particularly striking in this
regard are the statutes enacted in the early Nineteenth Century declaring it a
3
public nuisance to store gunpowder in cities. The gunpowder typically
posed no present harm. The rationale for these statutes was the risk that the
gunpowder would ignite accidentally and burn the whole city down. The
measures were purely prophylactic - to head off the risk of a potential
catastrophe.
We also see the connection between public nuisance and risk in the
prevalence of public nuisance actions against activity said to "offend
4
The early leet courts were
decency" or undermine "public morals."
concerned not only with obstructed roads and rivers but also with "bawdy
5
The Americans
houses, disorderly ale-houses, [and] night-walkers."
followed suit. A Tennessee statute of 1915 declared "the sale of intoxicating
liquors, the keeping, maintaining or conducting bawdy or assignation houses,
and the conducting, operating, keeping, running or maintaining gambling

8 (1752) 27 Eng. Rep. 105 [AMB 158].
9 Id. at 106.
'0

Spencer, supra note 7, at 71.

Ii Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass ProductsLiability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741,
800 (2003).
12 Id. at 802.
13 WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 60-66 (1996).
14 E.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 50,
1-6; Fla. Stat. § 823.01.
15

§ 1;

Spencer, supra note 7, at 60.

Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§

13-2917; Cal. Penal Code

§

370; Ga. Code

§ 41-
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houses" to be public nuisances.1 6 These sorts of activities do not harm
particular individuals in any conventional sense, such as physically harming
a person or property or creating an economic loss. The reason they
historically appear on the list of public nuisances is that they were thought to
threaten the social norms of the community. They posed a risk to the
community - one that was collective and moral, as opposed to physical or
financial - but a perceived risk all the same.
We can also discern the risk-regulating nature of public nuisance in the
very definitions of the action. Public nuisance has always been defined as
something that harms "the common and public welfare," in Bracton's terms, 7
or as an interference "with a right common to the general public," to quote
the Restatement.'8 The proper way to understand this, in my opinion, is that
a public nuisance is a "public bad" - the inverse of public good. In other
words, it is a risk that is nonexcludable and nonrivalrous and therefore affects
all.1 9 Admittedly some states define a public nuisance numerically, in terms
of its effect on more than a minimal number of people. 20 But the relevant
point is that a public nuisance is different from a mass tort that imposes actual
injury on a large number of persons, like an airplane crash.21 Because it is an
interference with a right common to the general public, it may harm some
individuals more than others, and some not at all - at least not in an
immediate sense. What a public nuisance does, insofar as it affects a right
common to the general public, is to impose a risk of harm on the general

public.
It is also relevant that the remedy for a public nuisance, throughout the
great span of history, has been either a criminal sanction or some form of
mandatory relief requiring the defendant to correct the offending condition.
As Donald Gifford observes, "[t]here is no historical evidence... that the state
(or its predecessor under English law, the Crown) was ever able to sue for
damages to the general public resulting from a public nuisance." 22 This is
16 State ex rel. Mynatt v. King, 191 S.W. 352, 352-53 (Tenn. 1916), quoting 1915 Tenn. Pub. Acts,
Chapter 11.
17 HENRY DE BRACTON, 3 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 191, f. 232b
(Samuel E. Thorne Ed. 1977).
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821(B)(1).
19 Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort? 4 J. TORT L, No. 2 1, 8-9 (2011) [hereinafter
Public Nuisance].
20 See e.g., N.M. Stat. § 30-8-1 ("A public nuisance consists of knowingly creating, performing or
maintaining anything affecting any number of citizens without lawful authority ...

21

").

Cf FEC v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (distinguishing an injury that is "abstract" and "widely

shared" from a mass tort where "large numbers of individuals share the same common-law injury").

Epstein cites City of McAlester v. Grand Union Tea Co. 98 P.2d 924, 926 (Okla. 1940), in which an
Oklahoma court held that it was not a public nuisance for a door-to-door salesman to commit multiple

trespasses. This is a good example of the distinction because it shows that even when the trespasses
affected many homeowners and took place over a period of time, the multiple intrusions did not qualify

as a public nuisance because they did not harm a right common to the general public.
22 Gifford, supra note 11, at 782; see In Re Lead Paint Litg., 191 N.J. 405, 924 A.2d 484 (2007)
(observing that the state could not historically sue for damages resulting from public nuisance).
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readily explainable if the action was designed in significant part to prevent
future harm to an often indeterminate set of persons. The identity of those
likely to be injured, and the magnitude of the harm they would likely suffer,
would be impossible to determine with anything approaching confidence. If
the risk is widespread and significant, the sensible course of action is to deter
or eliminate the risk, rather than waiting for harm to materialize and then
toting up the losses.
Finally, it is relevant that public nuisance, before the Restatement
(Second) of Torts sought to make public nuisance a tort, was effectively a
strict liability offense?3 There is no evidence that the action required proof
of any fault on the part of the defendant, whether it be intent or negligence.
The landowner whose tree blew down in a windstorm and blocked the
highway could be charged with a public nuisance, as could a defendant whose
boat capsized in a storm and blocked a navigable river. These were acts of
God, but they interfered with rights common to the general public. Strict
liability has long been associated with activities that pose a high risk of harm
to others, whether keeping wild animals or engaging in blasting.2 4 Of course,
these activities only result in liability if they cause actual harm. In that.
respect, public nuisance is different. But the strict liability aspect of public
nuisance reinforces the understanding that public nuisance is centered on
25
activities or conditions that pose a risk of future harm.
Indeed, it is not clear historically that it was necessary to prove that the
defendant caused the condition injurious to the general public, except in the
sense in which the federal courts speak of "redressability" as an element of
Article III standing.2 6 What was critical was that the defendant was in a
position to eliminate the condition that constituted a public nuisance. If the
defendant could cut down the fallen tree or remove the capsized boat - or for
that matter, could take the gunpowder out of the city or close the gambling
den - then it was appropriate to charge the defendant with maintaining a
public nuisance.2 7 The whole point of the action was to protect the public
from potential harm, not to compensate for past harm. The reason to single
out the defendant was because the defendant was in a position to correct the
threatening condition?

23
24

See Spencer supra note 7, at 82.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

519 (stating that those who engage in abnormally

dangerous activities will be held strictly liable for damage they cause).
25 See Melker v. New York, 190 N.Y. 481, 490-91, 83 N.E. 565, 568 (1908) ("A nuisance does not
rest upon the degree of care used....").
26 See Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (explaining how an injury must

be redressable by the lawsuit for federal courts to have Article III jurisdiction).
27
28

See Novak supranote 13, at 60-66.
If the defendant cannot or will not abate the nuisance, some states allow others to do so at the

cost to the defendant. Ill. Comp. Stat. 720 ILCS 5/47-25; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-335; § 19a-338-340; Tex.
Health & Safety Code § 343.012; Colo. Rev. Stat. 16-13-303; Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 195.130.

JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY

352

[VoL. 17.2

William Prosser missed all this when he undertook to add public
nuisance to the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the 1960s. 29 He added
comments to the Restatement claiming that public nuisance requires proof of
"substantial harm" and that the defendant act either "intentionally and
unreasonably," or "negligently" or "recklessly," or in furtherance of an
"abnormally dangerous" activity. 30
He cited no authority for these
propositions. Instead, faced with a dearth of precedent that characterized
public nuisance in terms characteristic of tort law, he simply cut and pasted
provisions that the First Restatement had adopted for private nuisance, and
incorporated them into comments indicating that they were also elements of
establishing an action for public nuisance. This was pure revisionism.3
Whether or not one agrees that, as conventionally understood, public
nuisance was significantly about risk regulation, there can be no doubt that
the prominent litigation campaigns launched in recent years against a variety
of alleged public nuisances are grounded in a perceived need to regulate
forms of risk.
The litigation brought by state attorneys general against the tobacco
companies seeking recovery of medical expenses incurred by states because
of smoking-related illnesses got the ball rolling. 32 Smoking clearly causes
actual harm to many individual smokers and poses a risk of harm to many
more. But the state governments did not seek to recover medical expenses
based on some right of subrogation for persons actually injured. Instead, they
claimed that smoking was associated with a higher rate of state expenditures
for health care on an aggregate basis under programs like Medicaid. Thus,
the tobacco companies were charged with creating what was both an existing
harm and a risk to the public, which in turn had created a present harm to the
public fisc. The relief sought - which was unprecedented for a public
nuisance action - was monetary compensation for the states in dealing with
the fallout from the public harm and risk.33
The multiple actions brought against legacy manufacturers who sold
lead paint before it was banned in 1978 targeted a more conventional physical
risk.34 The risk here was that some of the paint remained in older buildings,
would flake off and that the flakes would be ingested by children living in
29

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).

30

Id.

31

Merrill, Public Nuisance, supra note 19, at 20-29 details the sorry episode.

32 See Nora Freeman Engstrom & Robert L. Rabin, Pursuing Public Health Through Litigation:
Lessons from Tobacco and Opioids, 73 STAN. L. REV. 285, 301-05 (2021).
33

The states were never required to prove that smoking had actually caused them to incur higher

expenditures. It was doubtful that they could do so on any rigorous basis, given that smoking is also
associated with reduced life expectancy, which in turn means lower lifetime medical expenses for many
committed smokers. See w. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, 9

TAx POL'Y &ECON. 51, 92 (1995).
34 See DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES (2010); See
also People v. ConAgra Grocery Products, Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); In Re Lead
Paint Litg., 191 N.J. 405, 924 A.2d 484 (2007).
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the buildings creating blood lead poisoning. Again, the actions were
predicated on the risk that this had or would happen, unless strenuous efforts
were made to assure that all lead paint was removed from residential
buildings. Proof that any defendant's paint had caused actual injury to
particular children was not offered and was evidently not deemed necessary
in a public nuisance action.35
The same story applies to the public nuisance suits brought against gun
manufacturers. 36 The claim was that the guns were sold in a distribution chain
that did not adequately protect against the risk that the guns would come into
the hands of criminals or mass killers.37 No proof was offered that any
particular gun had caused any particular harm, and that this was due to the
38
defendants' methods of distribution. The demand was to require a
modification of those distribution practices in order to reduce the risk of this
happening in the future.3 9
The suits against utilities that burn coal or oil companies that sell
petroleum, alleging that they are responsible for emissions of carbon dioxide
that contribute to global warming, are also grounded in a concern about risk.
There is a broad consensus that human activity - including the combustion
of carbon fuels - has led to an increase in average global temperatures and
may produce greater and potentially more destabilizing increases as carbons
dioxide accumulates in the atmosphere. But the negative welfare effects of
these projected temperature increases are nearly all hypothesized to occur in
the future, such as the need for coastal cities to build higher seawalls to
protect against rising sea levels.4 0 These are reasonable concerns, but they
are risks all the same. The invocation of public nuisance as a source of
authority to address these concerns is a form of risk regulation.
The most recent round of public nuisance suits has targeted drug
companies that sell opioids.4' The claim is that aggressive marketing by these
35

See, e.g., ConAgra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 108 ("Defendants are liable for promoting lead paint for

interior residential use. To the extent that this promotion caused lead paint to be used on residential
interiors, the identity of the manufacturer of the lead paint is irrelevant.")

36 See Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp. 273 F.3d 536 (3rd
Cir. 2001); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004); City of Philadelphia v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002).
37

See cases cited id.

38

/d.

39
40

Id.

U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, 1 CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH

NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 10 (Donald J. Wuebbles et al. eds., 2017) (predicting sea levels to rise
"several inches" in the next 15 years and one to four feet by 2100). See City of New York v. Chevron

Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) (dismissing a public nuisance suit raising these concerns).
41

See Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 32, at 316-21; State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No.

CJ-2017-816, 2019 WL 4019929, at *1-2 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019); Jackie Fortier & Brian
Mann, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay Oklahoma $ 572 Million in Opioid Trial, NPR (Aug. 26,
2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/08/26/754481268/judge-in-opioid-trial-rulesjohnson-johnson-must-pay-oklahoma-572-million; Sara Randazzo, Johnson & Johnson Settles New York
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firms, directed in significant part at physicians, has led to the overprescription of these drugs.42 This, in turn, has produced high rates of
addiction, which has caused persons to turn to black-market fentanyl and
heroin to sustain their addiction, often resulting in debilitating behavior and
all-too-often death by overdose. The argument, as in the case of the gun
cases, is that the marketing campaign, combined with inadequate controls on
the behavior of actors further down the distribution chain, enhanced the risk
of opioid addiction." The claim for relief, as in the tobacco cases, is for
damages to compensate the states for expenses incurred in dealing with the
fallout from opioid addiction."
The policy questions raised by the recent surge of public nuisance
litigation are unquestionably serious ones. They all entail questions about
how best to regulate widespread risks to public health and welfare. Public
nuisance is, at least in significant part, about risk regulation. The question is
whether public nuisance should be enlisted as a vehicle for addressing the
complex risks motivating the recent litigation campaigns.

I.

THE LITIGATION MODEL

Once we see that public nuisance is in significant part about risk
regulation, it is important to consider the institutional aspects of public
nuisance as it emerged during the formative period of the doctrine - from
roughly the Twelfth through the Nineteenth Centuries. It was during this
period that public nuisance solidified and took on the institutional features
that continue to shape its invocation today. We can call this the litigation
model of risk regulation.
A.

The English Background

At the beginning of this era, when public nuisance was asserted and
enforced in local sheriff's courts, public nuisance was simply a version of
customary law. Certain activities or conditions were deemed by general
consensus to pose an unacceptable risk to the general welfare of the local
community. These sentiments were observed and shared by local sheriffs,
who indicted those in a position to correct the activity, on pain of

Opioid Case for $230 Million, WSJ (June 26, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/johnson-johnsonsettles-new-york-opioid-case-for-230-million-11624716067.
42 Art van Zee, The promotion and marketing of oxycontin: commercial triumph,
public health
tragedy, 99-2 Am. J. Public Health 221 (2009).
43

See articles cited supra note 41.

Id.
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"amercement" or even forfeiture if they failed to comply.45 In this fashion,
local community norms that disapproved of blocking public streets,
contaminating streams used to water animals, or maintaining a bawdy alehouse, were enforced through the authority of the sheriff.
This mode of risk regulation made sense given that it emerged in an
"unpoliced and unregulated society, in which local government was
rudimentary or non-existent." 4 6 At this stage in its evolution, it is probably a
mistake to imagine that public nuisance took a form we would recognize as
litigation. Direct enforcement of community norms by the local sheriff was
the best available mechanism for managing the perceived risks.
The evolution of public nuisance in England over the ensuing years is
47
As is
The best account is provided by John Spencer.
complex.
a
gradual
see
we
generally,
more
government
English
of
characteristic
movement over time toward greater control by central institutions.
We have little in the way of direct documentary evidence about what
went on in the sheriffs' leets, or for that matter in the local justice of the peace
courts that eventually replaced them. By contrast, the common law courts
soon attracted aspiring law students who kept notes about decisions,
collected in Year Books. The earliest appearance of public nuisance in the
Year Books was as a defense to an action based on what became private
nuisance. The common law courts initially decided that public and private
nuisance were mutually exclusive. Hence, "[i]f what the defendant had done
affected the plaintiff only, this was a matter for the courts of the common
law, but if it affected the whole community it was exclusively a matter for
the local criminal courts, and the common law courts had no jurisdiction over
lt."4s

The common law courts gained a toehold over public nuisance actions
when they decided, following a dictum by Fitzherbert in a decision in 1535,49
that a plaintiff who alleged "special injury" from a public nuisance could
have that claim adjudicated in a common law court. This allowed plaintiffs
who alleged actual damages different in kind from the general public to have
their case against the defendant heard in a common law court. Although this
was not the best reading of the Fitzherbert dictum, the special injury
exception was eventually interpreted to mean that the cause of action asserted
by the plaintiff in such a case was a species of public nuisance liability, as
45 William McRae Jr., The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. Fla. L. Rev.
27 (1948).
46 Neyers, supra note 6, at 6 (citation omitted).
47

See generally Spencer, supra note 7.

Id. at 59.
49 Anon., Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1535). The date is sometimes given as 1536. The
yearbook entry bears the date "XXVII Henry VIII," which could be anywhere from April 1535 to April
1536. However, these yearbooks were only published through 1535 and the compilation lists the relevant
date as 1535. The 1536 date likely comes from an error by Holdsworth, which Prosser repeated. Denise
Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradoxof the Special Injury Rule, 28 Ecology Law
Quarterly 755, 796 n.157 (2001).
48
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-

opposed to an action for negligence or private nuisance or some other
established tort.so
Starting about the same time, the central government - the Attorney
General as the principal legal officer of the realm and the royal courts
asserted control over the action for public nuisance. First the Star Chamber
and later the Kings Bench began to hear prosecutions for crimes that the court
itself created. These actions were brought by the Attorney General or in the
name of the Attorney General. The offenses came to include a variety of
things like blasphemy (originally the province of the ecclesiastical courts)
and public bathing in the nude.s' The actions were generally collected by
treatise writers under the heading "public mischief," but some writers also
described the miscellany of offenses as "public nuisances," thus contributing
to the impression that at least the Kings Bench had original jurisdiction over
the offenses against common morality that had formerly been prosecuted
locally as public nuisances.
Also contributing to the centralizing trend was the struggle between the
Stuart Kings and Parliament. James II in particular insisted that he had a
dispensing power which would absolve any subject in advance from the duty
to comply with an Act of Parliament. Parliament countered that this was
subject to a limitation: The King could not use the dispensing power to
license the commission of a crime that was malum in se or a public nuisance.
Thus, Parliament took to inserting clauses into statutes insisting that the
forbidden behavior was a public nuisance - in order to insulate it from any
assertion of the royal dispensing power.52 This gave rise, in a backhanded
way, to the practice of using legislation to characterize particular activities or
conditions as a public nuisance, which eliminated the purely customary
foundation of the doctrine.
The next turn of the screw occurred in the late Eighteenth and early
Nineteenth Centuries, when the Attorney General or individuals suing as
relators in the name of the name of the Attorney General were allowed to
seek injunctions in Chancery against a public nuisance. This effectively
transformed what had previously been regarded as a local criminal
prosecution into a civil action seeking injunctive relief in one of the royal
courts (without regard to whether the moving party could show "special
injury"). With this development, "the usual method of repressing [public
nuisances] ceased to be a public prosecution in the criminal courts and
became an injunction issued in the civil courts."53 In short, the litigation
model of public nuisance was complete, characterized by a moving party (the
Attorney general or a relator), a defendant, and decision by a judge.
50 See Merrill, PublicNuisance, supra note 19, at 13-16 (arguing that what Fitzherbert
meant was
that the possibility of a criminal action in the leet for public nuisance should not preempt a conventional
common law action for trespass on the case arising out of the same condition).
51 Spencer, supra note 7, at 61.

52

Spencer supranote 7, at 63-64.

53

Spencer, supra note 7, at 66.
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Although the English history up to the Nineteenth Century reveals the
gradual emergence of the litigation model, it bears emphasis that the relevant
actors had no special calling in risk regulation. The list of things that could
constitute a public nuisance remained grounded in longstanding customary
law, augmented by additional activities identified by Parliament (and
possibly by the Kings Bench) as being a public nuisance. The persons
entitled to initiate public nuisance suits were no longer limited to local
sheriffs or justices of the peace, but had been extended to relators suing in
the name of the Attorney General, although these retained at least in form the
idea that prosecution of a public nuisance was a governmental function. And
the fmal decision maker in determining whether an activity or condition
constituted a public nuisance, and in fixing the appropriate remedy, were
generalist judges.
In short, if we view public nuisance as a form of risk regulation, the
English litigation model, as it had evolved to the middle of the Nineteen
Century, was an amateurish endeavor. But if we recall that the relevant risks
were local and easily understood, and that government at both the national
and local level was a very skeletal operation, this is hardly surprising. The
nature of the risks and the available institutional capacity to address them
came together in a way that, if not very sophisticated by modern standards,
at least made a certain amount of sense.
B.

The American Version

The English version of public nuisance "was adopted without
significant change in colonial America and subsequently in the new republic
during its early years."54 In broad outline, this meant that the core cases of
public nuisance were the obstruction of public roads and navigable waters,
actions were brought by public prosecutors seeking correction of these
conditions, the available relief was either a monetary fine or an order
directing the defendant to abate the offending condition, and the fmal word
on both liability and the form of the relief was delivered by judges. Civil
actions seeking damages were permitted only in the case of individuals who
could prove special injury from the public nuisance.
The American legal community in the early years of the Republic
probably understood the set of ills encompassed by public nuisance to be
those set forth in Blackstone's widely-read account. He listed a hodge-podge
of activities or conditions:
(1)

Obstructing a public way;

54 Gifford, supra note 11, at 800.
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Engaging in conduct that constitutes a private nuisance to multiple
persons;

(3)

Operating a disorderly establishment, such as a brothel or
gambling house;

(4) Running a lottery;
(5)

Storing large quantities of explosives, as well as making, selling or
setting-off fireworks;

(6) Eavesdropping and publicly quarrelsome behavior.ss
Blackstone's formidable powers of synthesis were sorely tested in
conjuring up a general description of this catalogue of ills, which he
characterized as "the doing of a thing to the annoyance of all the king's
subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing which the common good requires."5 6
It is likely American prosecutors and courts initially assumed that public
nuisance could be prosecuted without any legislative authority. If so, this
changed over time along with the general repudiation of common law crimes.
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected common law crimes in 1812 as a matter of
federal law, reasoning that the notion was incompatible with separation of
powers and the limited authority of the federal government.57 The states
slowly came to a similar conclusion as a matter of state law, reinforced by
concerns about the lack of notice and retroactivity associated with judiciallycreated criminal law.58 Public nuisance, understood to be a species of
criminal liability, therefore required a statutory basis in the United States.
Eventually, nearly all states obliged by enacting statutes expressly
authorizing public nuisance actions. The statutes are generally of two types.
One type provides a generic definition of a public nuisance, as something
which (in one formulation) "tends to annoy the community, injure the health
of the citizens in general, or corrupt the public morals" or (in another) "which
injures or endangers the public health, safety or welfare." 59 A second type
followed the example set by Parliament in enumerating specific types of
activities or conditions as being a public nuisance. Some of the enumerated
public nuisances were the traditional ones: obstructing public roadways and
navigable waters, or emitting noxious substances, hazardous waste, or other
55 4 WILIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND * 166-69 (1769). Note that
aggregation of harms to multiple persons (large scale private nuisances) is only one of six categories

mentioned by Blackstone.
56 Id. at * 66.
57 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
58 John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction ofPenal Statutes, 71 vA. L.
REV. 189, 194 n.13 (1985).
59 The first definition is found in Georgia and Florida, see Georgia Comp. Acts § 41-1-6; Fla. Stat.
§ 823.01; the second in Kansas, see Kan. Stat. Ann. §231-6204.
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pollutants that affect the community. More numerous were efforts to codify
common morality, such as banning as public nuisances efforts to use,
manufacture, or distribute a controlled substance, or to use property for
prostitution, pornographic film screenings, and other lewd sexual activities,
or to use property for illicit gambling."
This pattern of enactments suggests mixed legislative objectives. The
general provisions conferring authority on prosecutors to bring low-level
criminal actions against those who threaten "the public health, safety or
welfare" could be seen as a codification of the customary law of public
nuisance. The assumption behind these acts may have been that prosecutors
would continue to bring actions to force responsible actors to remove
obstructions to highways and navigable waterways, halt pollution of streams
that serve as a source of potable water, and shut down brothels and gambling
dens. Alternatively, these provisions could be read as a kind of open-ended
delegation of authority to prosecutors and courts to address new sources of
risk that might arise in the future. The legislators may have anticipated that
new technologies (like steam engines) or new moral imperatives (like the
prohibition movement) would arise, and that it was desirable to have a
flexible source of government authority to respond to these developments if
future legislatures were slow to react.
The enactments that list specific activities or conditions as public
nuisances suggest that these statutes also performed a signaling function. If
the legislature concluded that specific activity posed a threat to the health,
safety or welfare of communities, it could pass a statute declaring the activity
in question a public nuisance. This would signal to prosecutors and courts
that the legislature expected the activity or condition in question to be
prohibited. For example, when the New York legislature was informed that
black currents can carry a rust that damages white pine trees, it responded by
enacting a measure declaring cultivating or growing black currents to be a
public nuisance.61 Attaching the label "public nuisance" to such an activity,
which would ordinarily be regarded as harmless, informed prosecutors that
they should take action to charge it criminally, and that courts should respond
by imposing fines or issuing orders requiring that the offending activity be
abated.
Legislation authorizing regulation of particular risks in the name of
public nuisance had an additional advantage: given the antiquity of public
nuisance, it served to buttress this form of regulation against constitutional
attack. Thus, in Mugler v. Kansas,62 the Court rejected a constitutional
challenge to a state statute directing local sheriffs to seize and destroy stocks
of intoxicating liquors on the ground that the act could be construed as a
60 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 823.09; Wis. Stat. § 823.113; Wis. Stat. § 823.20; O.C.G.A. § 41-3-1; 50
Okl. Stat. § 21; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-343; Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-13-303; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 195.130; Id. §
573.537; Fla. Stat. § 823.05; id. § 823.10; id. § 823.13.
61 N.Y. Envtl Conserv. Law § 9-1301 (1).
62 123 U.S. 623, 670-74 (1887).
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public nuisance measure. And in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,63 Justices
Holmes and Brandeis debated whether a Pennsylvania anti-subsidence
statute could properly be characterized as a public nuisance regulation. The
shared assumption was that if it was, the statute would not require the
payment of compensation as a taking.
In terms of procedures, all states authorized public nuisance actions to
be brought by public prosecutors seeking criminal penalties, usually modest
fines or limited terms of incarceration that would classify the offense as a
misdemeanor." Some conferred this authority on local prosecutors, others
on the state attorney general, still others on both. Criminal public nuisance
statutes often empowered local officials to abate the nuisance at the expense
of the defendant after a certain period of time had passed.65 This made the
public nuisance action something like a forfeiture proceeding. With respect
to injunction proceedings, the surviving statutes are mixed. Some limit
injunction actions to state officers, others permit such actions to be brought
by private parties who have suffered special injury, and a few permit such
actions to be brought by "any resident." 66 When an injunction action is
brought by a private party, some states permit the attorney general to take
over the action, as under qui tam statutes.6 7
Notwithstanding the special injury exception and the occasional state
statutes authorizing private parties to institute injunction actions, the
dominant mode of initiating a public nuisance action has long remained an
action by public legal officers. One survey of published opinions from 1890
to 1929 reports that roughly nine public nuisance actions were initiated by
public officers for every one brought by a private party.68
The American experience with public nuisance differs in certain
respects from the English model, primarily in the requirement of a statutory
foundation for criminal prosecutions. But the basic institutional setup
remains the same. In both systems, the substantive law is based on a
foundation of customary law, supplemented by statutory add-ons. In both
systems, a public nuisance action is initiated by a public officer or someone
authorized to sue in the name of a public officer, with the exception of private
actions based on an allegation of special injury. In both systems, the remedy
63

260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes, J.); id.at 421-22 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-335-40; Miss. Code § 45-8-111; Ga. Code § 41-1-6; Cal. Pen. Code
§ 373a; Kan. Stat. § 21-6204; Utah Code § 76-10-801; Utah Code § 76-10-802-07; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 132917; Minn. Stat. § 609.74-75; Fla. Stat. § 823.01; Ill. Corn. Stat. 720 ILCS 5/47-25; Tex. Health & Safety
Code § 343.012. In a few states, a person who violates public nuisance law may be guilty of a felony.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 579.105; Mo. Rev. Stat § 195.130; Fla. Stat. §823.04; Fla. Stat. § 823.10. The possibility
of a felony conviction is typically reserved for public nuisances involving controlled substances. Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 195.130; id. § 579.105; Fla. Stat. § 823.10.
65 III. Comp. Stat. 720 ILCS 5/47-25; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-335; § 19a-338-340; Tex. Health
Safety Code § 343.012; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-303. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 195.130.
66 Miss. Code 45-8-112.
67 Ga. Code § 41-3-3.
&

6

68

Gifford, supra note 11, at 805.
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is either a modest criminal fine, an abatement order, or a civil injunction,
again with the exception of the special injury suit which typically seeks
damages. And in both, the determination that a particular activity is a public
nuisance, and if so what remedy is appropriate, is given to courts of general
jurisdiction.
Did the litigation model make sense as a form of risk regulation?
Arguably it did, if we consider the nature of state governments up through
the Nineteenth and into the early Twentieth Centuries. Those governments
closely conformed to the tripartite model reflected in the U S. Constitution:
legislature, executive, and judiciary. Legislatures typically met every-other
69
There
year for a few months; members often served for only a single term.
was no professional staff to speak of, and bills were commonly drafted and
pressed on legislators by lobbyists. The executive was headed by a governor
and a few other elected officers, such as an attorney general. But again, these
officials had little in the way of a professional staff to assist them. The
prosecution of state crimes was generally handled by attorneys elected
locally at the county level. The judiciary was also often elected, sometimes
in multi-county districts, and served with minimal support staff.
Such a bare-bones government, operating without any permanent staff,
could regulate only those risks that could be identified with a high degree of
consensus. And the mechanism of regulation had to conform the litigation
model, drawing upon the legislature to identify particular risks to target for
regulation, using the attorney general or local prosecuting attorneys to
investigate potential sources of harm and to institute proceedings, and relying
on the courts to render judgments that would be backed by the power of the
state. But the litigation model would seem to be woefully inadequate to
engage in meaningful regulation of the far-more-complicated risks that
would emerge in the Twentieth and into the Twenty-first Centuries.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL

III.

Although public nuisance was an acceptable form of risk regulation up
through the middle of the Nineteenth Century - given the nature of risks
thought to be amenable to regulation and the limited governmental
institutions available to regulate those risks - population growth,
urbanization, and a host of new technologies soon revealed its inadequacies.
An alternative mode of risk regulation slowly emerged. This can be called
the administrative model, the regulatory state, or simply the bureaucracy if
one prefers. Over the course of roughly one hundred years, from the 1880s
to the 1980s, the administrative model expanded to become the dominant
form of risk regulation in both the U.K. and America.
69

See, e.g., JOSEPH D. KEARNEY & THOMAS W. MERRILL, LAKEFRONT: PUBLIC TRUST AND

PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CHICAGO 23-36 (2021) (describing the Illinois legislature as it functioned in the late

1860s).
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The key innovation here was the creation of a new type of institution
with a permanent staff that was delegated broad legal authority to investigate
and regulate particular classes of risks - the administrative agency. The
various agencies were created and their powers defined by the legislature.
The heads of the agencies typically rotated with changes in the dominant
political coalition, but much of the staff consisted of professionals protected
by civil service laws who could claim a significant degree of expertise, either
by specialized training or longstanding experience. Some type of public
input was usually allowed before the agencies embarked on significant
regulatory initiatives. And the legislature nearly always provided for judicial
review of final agency action, typically under some kind of reasonableness
standard.
The process by which public nuisance came to be replaced by
administrative regimes in England is well described by Spencer:
At one time the crime of public nuisance did valiant service in the cause of public health
and safety. In the days before there was much legislation on public health matters, public
nuisance was the only offence for which it was possible to prosecute those who stank out

the neighborhood with fumes from glass-works, tanneries and smelters, or who kept pigs
in the streets, or kept explosives in dangerous places, or spread infectious diseases, or

sold unwholesome food and drink, or left corpses of the relatives unburied, or made the
public highway dangerous or impassable, or created any other danger to public safety
and health. Over the last hundred years, however, virtually the entire area traditionally

the province of public nuisance prosecutions has been comprehensively covered by
statute.

70

Spencer proceeds to list the statutes that now regulate each of the
foregoing risks.7 What he does not note is that the statutes which now
regulate the dangers to public health and welfare operate by delegating
authority to permanent administrative bodies to investigate potential risks
and bring enforcement actions.
In the U.S., the first foray of the federal government into risk regulation
occurred in the middle of the Nineteenth Century, with federal legislation
establishing a Board of Inspectors to test and inspect steamboat boilers,
which had the habit of exploding, often with catastrophic results. 72 Exploding
boilers were a new risk created by a new technology. No one suggested that
public nuisance provided an adequate model for addressing the problem.
Instead, a new entity, which in its structure and powers anticipated the
regulatory agencies of the Twentieth Century, was perceived to be the
superior solution.
Although much of the federal regulation that followed was concerned
with economic relationships, most prominently between railroads and
shippers, it was not long before Congress intervened in an area long thought
to lie at the core of public nuisance. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890
Spencer, supra note 7, at 76.

70
71

Id.
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JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 187-208 (2012).
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provided that "the creation of any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized
by law, to the navigable capacity of any waters, in respect of which the
73
United States has jurisdiction, is hereby prohibited." The Act further
delegated authority to the U.S. Army, acting through its Corps of Engineers,
to take legal action against, and if necessary remove, such obstructions to
navigable waters. Since the waters over which the United States had
jurisdiction were broadly defined (and would become even broader over
time), the Act effectively eliminated one important strand of public nuisance
regulation and put in its place an administrative unit organized as part of the
U.S. Army.
Eventually the administrative model spread to cover other risks
4
previously regulated by public nuisance. The Food and Drug Act and the
Meat Inspection Act of 190675 were enacted to regulate adulterated or
mislabeled food and drug products, another area that had been episodically
invoked in the name of public nuisance. As progressively amended over
time, the legislation established a significant regulatory agency - the Food
and Drug Administration - with extensive powers to prevent a variety of
threats to public health from consumable products.
Other risks that had been occasionally addressed by public nuisance,
such as air and water pollution, came under comprehensive regulation by the
Environmental Protection Agency with the enactment of the Clean Air Act
and Clean Water Act in the early 1970s. 76 Pursuant to a slew of major
environmental statutes enacted in the decade that followed, the EPA was also
given extensive authority over toxic wastes and hazardous waste sites.
Not all administrative regulation is federal of course. Obstruction of
highways is today generally handled by state departments of transportation,
although the Federal Highway Administration provides input in the form of
conditions attached to its significant grants of federal funding for highways.
Obstruction of city streets is generally addressed by departments of streets
and sanitation, or similar entities. As a result of the creation of these
municipal entities, public nuisance enters the picture, if at all, in the form of
suits seeking special damages for such obstructions. For example, in 532
77
Madison Gourmet Foods v. FinlandiaCenter, Inc. the New York Court of
Appeals considered legal liability for two separate incidents in which
collapsed buildings in Manhattan blocked important city streets. The
obstructions were removed by contractors hired by city officials. The
plaintiffs sought to recover damages because city officials directed the
closure of the streets in front of their businesses. The court unanimously
rejected the claims of special injury, finding that businesses suffering
economic losses were too numerous to make their injury "special."
73 26 Stat. 426, 454 (1890).
74 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
75 34 Stat. 674-79 (1906).
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
77 96 N.Y. 2d 280, 750 N.E.2d 1097 (2001).
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The primary area of public nuisance which has not been
comprehensively supplanted by the modern administrative model concerns
activity historically seen as corrupting public morals. The main reason for
this, of course, is that the social consensus supporting strict regulation of
these activities no longer exists. Even so, as lotteries and gaming have
become socially acceptable activities, with many states adopting state-run
lotteries and legalizing casinos and sports betting, the regulation of these
activities has been committed to the administrative model, in the form of state
gaming commissions. And as one state after another moves to legalize
recreational marijuana, again we fmd that the liberalizing states are adopting
administrative bodies to license and regulate producers and distributors. The
only category on Blackstone's list that has not been given over to the
administrative model is eavesdropping and publicly quarrelsome behavior. 78
But one will search in vain for any recent reported decision charging
someone who engages in such behavior as having committed a public
nuisance.

IV. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
Going forward, risk regulation will surely follow some version of the
administrative model, not the public nuisance doctrine. For example,
although there was significant controversy about emergency orders issued
during the Covid pandemic by the Centers for Disease Control and state
governors, 79 no one suggested that a better approach would be to rely on
lawsuits filed under the public nuisance doctrine.
The question then
becomes: Does it make sense to keep public nuisance law around, perhaps as
a gap-filler in the event that existing statutory and regulatory authority cannot
address certain unanticipated forms of public risk as they emerge?
A.

The CurrentFunction of PublicNuisance

In general, I am skeptical of claims that public nuisance can serve a
useful role as a fallback in the event of an emergency not covered by one or
more administrative schemes. The current approach, in the event of a crisis,
is for the executive to take unilateral action, invoking one or more statutes as
a justification.8 0 This is what happened after 9/11, during the fmancial crisis
of 2008, and in the Covid epidemic. These forms of emergency response

78 See BLACKSTONE supra note 55, at *166-69.
79 Avi Weiss, Note, Binding the Bound: State Executive Emergency Powers and Democratic

Legitimacy in the Pandemic, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1853, 1855 (2021).
80 See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2010)
(arguing that the inevitable response to emergencies in the modern world is discretionary executive

action).
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raise legitimate questions about whether the executive has exceeded the
81
scope of its delegated authority. But the proper response to these concerns
is to enact better legislation conferring emergency authority on the executive,
perhaps with some kind of fast-track procedure allowing elected legislative
bodies to weigh in to ratify or modify the executive response.8 2 In any event,
public nuisance litigation would be far too slow and uncertain in result to
serve as a gap-filler in a true emergency.
Historically, there have been situations where public nuisance has been
invoked out of necessity, because there was no other body of law to apply.
83
Transboundary pollution cases are the principal example. But here too, the
modern trend is to draw upon federal statutes to resolve such disputes, rather
than to rely on general principles of public nuisance. Global environmental
problems, like climate change, requires the widespread embrace throughout
the world of technological innovations if any effective solution is to be
reached.
Nor it is necessary to retain public nuisance in order to provide a vehicle
for aggregate litigation. Public nuisance arguably performed this function
before the emergence of class actions. Today, class actions can provide a
vehicle for large numbers of similarly-situated persons to obtain injunctive
relief against existing harms or well-documented risks of future harm. They
have often proven to be unworkable as a method of securing damages for
large numbers of persons who have suffered similar injuries, given the need
for individualized determinations of damages. But if class actions are
unworkable as a form of aggregate litigation to recover damages, there is no
reason to think that public nuisance would be any more workable. The better
way to provide compensation for widespread injuries is to create an
administrative compensation scheme, as happened after 9/11.84
The most frequently cited justification for the continued deployment of
public nuisance is that it can serve as a "catalyst" to stimulate new legislation
and administrative regulation. This is the only plausible justification for the
one remaining use of public nuisance in contemporary America: as an arrow
in the quiver of claims asserted by state and local governments seeking to
recover monetary awards from corporate defendants allegedly responsible
for various social ills. But here too I think the argument fails.
The most fundamental flaw in the "catalyst" argument is that it rests on
a hubristic claim by proponents that they know the future course of political
evolution, and therefore litigation is justified as a means of accelerating the
81

See Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 141 S.Ct. 2485 (2021)

(enjoining nationwide eviction moratorium as exceeding the statutory authority of the Department of

HHS).
82 See weiss, supra note 79, at 1889.
83 See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DuKE L. J. 931, 937
(1997).
84 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 108-42, 115 Stat.
230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101); see virgilio v. City of New York, 407 F.3d 105, 112-113 (2d
Cir. 2005) (upholding the administrative process as exclusive).
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day when the future arrives. It is understandable that advocacy groups and
ambitious attorneys general would advance such arguments in support of
their litigating activities. But it is problematic for courts to accept a legal
claim - or to perpetuate litigation - on any basis other than what they believe
to be the best understanding of the law as it currently stands. To adopt a
ruling in the belief that it will serve as a "catalyst" for what the judge thinks
is the desirable course of future political change is to stop functioning as a
judge and take on what is essentially a political conception of the judicial
role.
As an empirical matter, there is reason to doubt that public nuisance
litigation will consistently stimulate political change in the direction that its
proponents seek, at least as part of a deliberate strategy. The public nuisance
suits against the gun industry misfired, as the industry went to Congress and
got a statute enacted preempting these efforts. 85 In effect, the litigation served
as a catalyst - for a backlash. Public nuisance has also been advocated as a
way to spur political action against climate change. The prominent idea here
is that judicial regulation of greenhouse gases is such an obviously bad idea
that it will induce industry to support administrative regulation as the lesser
evil. But so far, the courts have been unwilling to play the role of stalking
horse. The Supreme Court in American Electric Power held that what it
called the "federal common law of public nuisance" had been displaced by
the Clean Air Act. 86
The Second Circuit recently reached the same
conclusion with respect to state public nuisance. 7
Nora Engstrom and Robert Radin argue that the tobacco and opioid
litigation campaigns have served as a catalyst for needed change. 88 The
mechanism, they argue, is the discovery of damaging facts during the
litigation (widely publicized by the plaintiffs), which delegitimizes the
respective industries in the eyes of the public and creates a climate more
favorable to administrative regulation. 89 There is clearly something to this
account, at least in the context of the tobacco and opioid litigation, although
of course one cannot always expect civil discovery to yield up facts that will
sway public opinion.
Moreover, even though the tobacco and opioid litigation helped uncover
facts that reinforced public hostility toward the respective industries, the
causal connection between the litigation and enhanced administrative
regulation is not entirely clear. Congress failed to enact legislation giving
FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco when settlement of the tobacco
litigation was first reached in 1998 and did so only in 2009, more than ten
years after a scaled-down settlement that did not provide for FDA authority
85 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005),
86

15

U.S.C. §7901-03.

Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 131 S.Ct. 2527 (2011).

87 City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) (dismissing as preempted a
public nuisance suit based on state law).

88 Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 32.
89 Id.
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was concluded. 90 The litigation against the opioid manufacturers has
coincided with more vigorous enforcement of preexisting authority by
9
federal agencies and the enactment new legislation by Congress. 1 But
whether the litigation was the catalyst for this action is debatable. Arguably
rising public dismay about the depth and breadth of opioid crisis has been the
driving force behind both the litigation and the invigorated administrative
regulation.
Whether or not it is a catalyst for administrative regulation, it seems
clear that the model pioneered by Mississippi Attorney General Michael
Moore in the tobacco litigation is destined to be with us for the foreseeable
future. The model is powered by joint ventures between state attorneys
general and members of the personal injury bar, both driven by the prospect
of large financial recoveries. The attorneys general hope to achieve huge
settlements to supplement their budgets, and the personal injury lawyers to
reap large contingency fee awards. Some of these actors may also hope that
their efforts will serve as a catalyst for regulatory change. But the dominant
motivation is a type of rent-seeking, which explains the ahistorical claim that
public nuisance law authorizes large compensatory damages awards. It is
also important to note that public nuisance is not the only count charged in
these litigation campaigns, and its prominence varies from one context to
another. The litigation that has achieved the greatest success so far - the
tobacco and opioid litigation campaigns - has emphasized fraud, RICO, and
consumer protection counts as much or more than public nuisance. Hence,
it is not unlikely that the Michael Moore-inspired litigation strategy will roll
on, even if public nuisance eventually fades into oblivion.
The PathForward

B.

John Spencer has argued that public nuisance should be abolished, on
the ground that the functions it performed historically have been taken over
92
Moreover, the standard
by what I have called the administrative model.
formulations of the doctrine are so vague that they present an unacceptable
lack of fair notice to potential defendants. 93 One can add, in the U.S. context,
that some of the state statutes authorizing public nuisance actions may flunk
the nondelegation doctrine, which is often applied more rigorously under
state constitutional law than it has been as a matter of federal constitutional
law.94 And at the federal level, there is no statute authorizing public nuisance

90 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776-1852
(2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
91
92

Engstrom & Rabin, supra note 32, at 351.
Spencer, supra note 7, at 76-83.

93

Id.

94 But see Gundy v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2148 (2019) (Gorsuch, J. dissenting) (advocating
adoption of a more restrictive federal nondelegation doctrine).
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actions at all, making any attempt to assert a federal public nuisance claim
ultra vires.

In principle, Spencer is right: public nuisance has outlived its day and
should be laid to rest. Abolition is conceivable in the U.K., with its
centralized legislature and the use of Law Revision Commissions to propose
eliminating legal doctrines that no longer serve any good purpose. However,
outright abolition is probably unrealistic in the U.S., given that public
nuisance is subject to the authority of fifty states, whose legislatures
generally show little interest in cleansing the books of obsolete statutes.95
There is also the nontrivial problem that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
perpetrated the notion that public nuisance is a tort, which implicitly means
it is subject to implementation by courts as a matter of common law, whether
or not the legislature has authorized such a nebulous action. The Restatement
thus managed to revive the conception of the judicial role asserted by the Star
Chamber, now couched as a power to create judge-made rules of civil rather
than criminal liability.
Richard Epstein, writing in this symposium, argues that the solution is
to restore public nuisance to its common lineage with private nuisance. But
as previously explained, there is little overlap between the doctrines, other
than the common use of the word "nuisance." Public nuisance has been
described as "the great grab bag, the dust bin, of the law." 96 This is due to its
role as a public action designed to address a miscellany of threats to collective
welfare, some identified by custom, others by specific legislative direction.
Private nuisance has long been understood to be an interference with the use
and enjoyment of particular land. Moreover, the strategy would constrain
public nuisance only if the standard of care associated with private nuisance
is sufficiently constraining. Yet the law of private nuisance, at least as
formulated in the First and Second Restatement of Torts, would have courts
identify a private nuisance based on a judicial balancing of the gravity of the
harm as against the utility of the activity giving rise to offense. 97 This is
hardly a formula for reigning in the excesses of public nuisance law. Epstein
has advocated the restoration of a more articulated version of private
nuisance grounded in English common law. 98 But unless that vision gains
general acceptance, the current understanding of private nuisance law would
provide little constraint on the limits of public nuisance.
Another proposal would have courts limit public nuisance to its original
paradigmatic applications involving the blocking of public highways and
waterways and reasonable extensions thereof. 99 The idea is that public
nuisance should be defined as a denial of access to public facilities that are
95

GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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necessary for individuals to interact with each other as participating members
of society. Public nuisance, in effect, would converge with a common
understanding of the public trust doctrine.100 The public trust doctrine
prevents legislatures from denying public access to facilities necessary for
the free circulation of goods and persons; public nuisance, on this view,
would bar private action that has the effect of denying public access to such
facilities. This proposal has a certain normative appeal. But it ignores the
prominent role that public nuisance has always played, from its very
beginning, in enforcing conventional morality. As we have seen, public
nuisance as never been limited to preserving access to common modes of
public transport. From the very first, it was also directed at "bawdy houses"
There is also the oddity that preserving
and "disorderly ale-houses."' 0'
public access to public highways and navigable waterways is today given
over to administrative processes, with little evidence that the litigation model
plays a significant role in either context.
In previous writing, I have advocated that public nuisance liability
02
Assuming that public
should be interpreted in a "non-dynamic" fashion.
nuisance statutes remain on the books in every state, they should be
interpreted either as referring to the sorts of activity understood to be a public
nuisance at the time they were enacted, or they should be limited to the
specific conduct they reference as being a public nuisance. These laws
should not be read "dynamically" as extending to new forms of conduct
alleged to pose a risk to the general public since administrative action or, in
a pinch, emergency executive action, is today the generally accepted mode
of dealing with such problems. This proposal, like all the others except
Spencer's argument for legislative abolition, suffers from the flaw that it
would only work if generally accepted by judges as a form of collective selfrestraint. 03 There is some hope that judges, acting in fifty different
jurisdictions, will exercise self-restraint when called upon to enforce settled
law, since this is the very foundation of their authority. There is less hope of
self-restraint if judges are told by self-interested actors that the law gives
them unfettered discretion, and that they have an opportunity to use this
discretion to strike a blow for the public good.
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CONCLUSION

Although public nuisance is characterized as protecting rights common
to the public, it can also be regarded, in functional terms, as a strategy for
protecting against the risk of future harm - something the common law courts
could not provide through ordinary actions of breach of contract and tort.
Public nuisance made sense at a time when the relevant risks were local and
largely defined by custom, and government was a skeletal affair. With the
emergence of an alternative mode of risk regulation in the form of the
administrative model, the role of public nuisance as a type of risk regulation
became obsolete. Today, no one would think of responding to a new type of
risk by urging the legislature to label the risk a public nuisance and entrust
prosecutors and judges to use litigation to eliminate the risk.
The primary remaining function of public nuisance is as a prop in
litigation campaigns launched by public officials to shift large amounts of
monies from corporate defendants to state treasuries and plaintiff's law firms.
The only plausible public-interest justification for dusting off public nuisance
for this task is that the litigation may serve as a catalyst for better
administrative regulation. But it is inappropriate for a judge to invoke a legal
doctrine in order to stimulate political reform the judge regards as desirable.
Public nuisance should be limited to existing statutes authorizing such
actions, interpreted in a non-dynamic fashion to be limited to their assumed
applications at the time they were adopted.

